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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between philosophy and culture. It contends
that contrary to common understanding, it is philosophy which determines the 
unity of a culture. Yet this is an active and ongoing process. In our unifying and 
very diverse world, it is philosophy which has the task of providing a new 
humanism, by identifying those common values and ideas that ground individual 
cultures and that complement, in their diversity, the one culture of humanity.
     Fifty years ago, while developing what may be called his ‘philosophy of culture’,
Jacques Maritain stated, “What determines the unity of a culture is first and above all a
common philosophical structure, a certain metaphysical and moral attitude, a common
scale of values—in short, a common idea of the universe, of man and of life, of which the
social,  linguistic,  and juridical structures are, so to speak, the embodiment.”1  Such a
formulation seems to suggest that culture has emerged from philosophy, not the other
way around. To be sure, from ancient times until the present, philosophy and culture have
been intertwined, but the challenge is to determine the precise cause/effect nature of this
relation in each era and to point out its consequences.  Though a daunting task, it is a
crucial one, since the difference in approach makes all the difference when it comes to
that which really matters for our world in the present moment: the cultivation of a new
humanism.  Maritain, and many others like him in the last century, devoted their lives to
the cultivation of this new humanism and consistently approached the study of culture in
this context.  Reflecting upon the way in which this new humanism could bring a new
and needed unity to  culture,  he  stated  that  in  essence  it  “render[ed]  man  more  truly
human  and  [could]  manifest  his  original  greatness by  enabling  him  to  partake  of
everything in nature and in history capable of enriching him.”2  Not a few philosophers of
the last century saw this new humanism emerging, as the only alternative, from the ashes
of what may now be described as the in-humanism of the two world wars—wherein the
old monster of man’s inhumanity to man took ‘new’ and unimaginably horrific forms.
Writing just a few years before the end of World War II, Maritain wrote, “In my mind the
notion of the present trials endured by civilization [is] inseparable from that of a  new
humanism, which is in preparation in the present death struggle of the world, and which
at the same time is preparing the renewal of civilization….”3  This renewal, as Maritain
and many others realized, is not inevitable or necessary, but must be creatively sought
after and freely chosen and discovered anew in each generation.  “Culture,” he writes, “is
the  expansion  of  the  peculiarly  human  life,  including  not  only  whatever  material
development may be necessary and sufficient to enable us to lead an upright life on this
earth, but also and above all the moral development, the development of the speculative
and practical activities (artistic and ethical) peculiarly worthy of being called a human
development.”4  Such moral development, of course, cannot be imposed from top-down
structures or principles, but must be based on convictions that are born in freedom. A
similar point was aptly put by Benedict XVI recently in his encyclical on Hope, when he
wrote, 
“[W]e  must  acknowledge  that  incremental  progress  is  possible  only  in  the
material sphere. Here, amid our growing knowledge of the structure of matter and
in the light of ever more advanced inventions, we clearly see continuous progress
towards an ever greater mastery of nature. Yet in the field of ethical awareness
and moral decision-making, there is no similar possibility of accumulation for the
simple reason that man's freedom is always new and he must always make his
decisions anew. These decisions can never simply be made for us in advance by
others—if that were the case, we would no longer be free. Freedom presupposes
that  in  fundamental  decisions,  every  person  and  every  generation  is  a  new
beginning. Naturally, new generations can build on the knowledge and experience
of those who went before, and they can draw upon the moral treasury of the whole
of humanity. But they can also reject it, because it can never be self-evident in the
same way as material inventions. The moral treasury of humanity is not readily at
hand like tools that we use; it is present as an appeal to freedom and a possibility
for it.”5  
     When we return, in the light of all this, to our original quote concerning the relation
between philosophy and culture, we are better able to see the value of the philosophical
approach to culture taken by Maritain; he does not claim that the philosophical structure
determines  culture per  se,  but  that  it  determines  the  unity  of culture.   This  approach
distances  itself  from the  one  that  sees  culture  as  a  mere  by-product  of  a  top-down
philosophical enterprise which restrictively applies broad principles in a mechanistic and
deterministic way, emphasizing universality, but neglecting subjectivity and particularity.
Although Maritain speaks  about a common philosophical  structure,  which necessarily
entails a certain metaphysical and moral attitude, it is crucial to see that by common he
does not simply mean the same. Though he speaks about a common scale of values and a
common  idea  of  the  universe,  of  man  and  of  life,  he  precludes  a  universalistic,
deterministic, interpretation of the word common by noting that the embodying structures
of this common idea, namely,  the social, linguistic, and juridical constructions, are by
nature diverse and subjective, and if they aren’t supple enough to change, they die.  Thus,
the common idea of the universe, of man, and of life, too, must not be static; it must be
open  and  dynamic,  if  it  is  to  remain  alive  and  fruitful.   In  this,  he  has  certainly
appropriated the Heideggerian emphasis on subjectivity, which played such a key role in
the  transition  from modern  to  contemporary  philosophy.   It  is  well  known that  this
emphasis on subjectivity enabled philosophers to begin appreciating the world’s cultures
as genuine philosophic sources, which, in turn, has brought us today to the threshold of
what we may be able to speak about as a new philosophy for global times—a philosophy
that is profoundly connected to a new humanism.  
     Now to speak of a new philosophy for global times is not to undermine what has been
called the ‘unity of philosophical experience’ by important historians of philosophy, but
to insist, rather, that genuine philosophy is always alive, growing and changing;   growth
presupposes continuity, just as seeds grow into roots and trees.  Thus, in an attempt to
generate new philosophical insights for global times it is important to focus momentarily
upon  this  ‘unity  of  philosophical  experience’  that  constitutes  the  very  history  of
philosophy; this will help to guarantee that the new insights will spring from the living
tree of thought and will be able to provide not only fruit that looks delicious, but fruit that
really is delicious, and nourishing at the same time. 
     In this context, then, I want to suggest that the whole history of western philosophy
from Thales  to  the present  is  one magnificent  metaphysical  drama  wherein  the most
genuine human sages, and indeed the entire human race, are caught up in a fierce and
ferocious intellectual battle that almost completely transcends them, even though they
occupy center  stage in  the conflict.6   These  lofty intellectual  hostilities  are  ardently
associated  with  an  ancient  and  bitter  spiritual  dispute  over  the  nature  of  universals.
Glimpses of this struggle are seen only occasionally and only by the most attentive and
astute philosophers.  This sublime discord, to which all authentic intellectuals are drawn,
is  what  defines  metaphysics.  Such metaphysical  speculation,  far  from a  pedantic  ivy
tower pondering, set in the historical context of a so-called myopic scholasticism, is at
once the most  basic  and most  exalted speculation possible—a reflection in which,  to
varying degrees, all people of all times, whether wittingly or not, are involved.  For the
essence of the dispute revolves around the very meaning and destiny of the  universal
“man.”  Thus, this metaphysical drama is the key to a proper understanding of history
itself, for the question ends ultimately in demanding human persons to choose sides and
to daily align themselves, as they “write” history, with either the violent and deceptive
spiritual powers of iniquity and corruption, that are passing away, or with the kind and
true sacred forces of goodness and beauty, that shall last forever. In a word, the dynamic
discourse of universals is the most universal discourse of all.
     After  the  advent  of  Nominalism and  even  after  Cartesianism had  attempted  to
radically  reduce philosophy to mere  epistemology,  metaphysics  stubbornly refused to
give up its historical role of defining the very essence of the philosophical enterprise.
One part of this Cartesian reduction consisted in trying to remove the universal ideas
from the mind of God, where Augustine, in his attempt to modify Plato’s “exaggerated
realism,”7 had  so  masterfully  placed  them.   Once  Descartes  had  disassociated  the
universal ideas from the divine, his methodological decency compelled him to find the
orphaned universal concepts a proper home. His devotion to this daring procedure finally
came  to  an  end  when,  with  a  masterful  stroke  of  surgical  precision,  he  delicately
undertook to place the universal concepts into the very mind of man.  But a surgical error
had  gone unnoticed  during  this  grandiose  epistemological  experiment.   And such an
imprisonment could not last.  The metaphysical debate emerged again and again in the
most  unlikely  of  places,  much  to  the  dismay  of  those  who  thought  the  controversy
(associated as it was with theology at best and with religious superstition at worst) had
disappeared forever.  In the last century, for instance, when Willard Quine asked what
mathematics  was  really  all  about,  it  quickly  became  evident  that  the  three  supplied
answers, Logicism, Formalism, and Intuitionism, clearly corresponded to the traditional
philosophical  positions  in  regard  to  the  question  of  universals,  with  Logicism
corresponding  to  Realism,  Formalism  to  Nominalism,  and  Intuitionism  to
Conceptualism.8  In the words of Quine, “Classical mathematics . . . is up to its neck in
commitments  to an ontology of abstract  entities.   Thus it  is  that  the great  mediaeval
controversy  over  universals  has  flared  up  anew  in  the  modern  philosophy  of
mathematics.”9  To his credit, Quine himself came down on the side of Logicism, thereby
committing himself to a variety of realism.  To be sure, neither modernity nor the arrival
of post or late-modernity lessens the importance of the  universals  debate, in fact, they
intensify it.   Modern science and technology testify to both the significance of the debate
and to the weighty consequence of coming down on the right side.  In the case of modern
science and technology, of course, there is no contention over which side is the right one.
If universals did not really exist, how could we ever refer to laws, for instance, which
cause all specific electromagnetic spheres or fields to act in certain expected ways?  If
modern technology did not presuppose the genuine existence of universals, would we
ever have confidence to stake our lives on the reliability of our cars and airplanes?10 And
those  who  think  that  post-modernity’s  deconstructionism11 has  toppled  the  western
metaphysical  tradition,  have  understood  neither  deconstructionism  nor  the  universals
quandary at the heart of the metaphysical tradition. The former is primarily, a response
to, not simply a rejection of, the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, and thus counts as
another contribution to metaphysics.  Surely, both Husserl and Derrida strongly resisted
certain systems of metaphysical programming, but this is not to say that philosophers of
such  magnitude  weren’t  engaged  in  metaphysics.   John  Paul  II  description  of
phenomenology is helpful here, for he described it as “…first of all a style of thought, an
intellectual  relation  with  reality,  whose  essential  and constitutive  traits  one  hopes  to
gather, avoiding prejudices and schematism.”12  If this is an accurate characterization of
phenomenology, who could imagine Derrida disagreeing with it,13 and who could fail to
see its important metaphysical implications?  Besides, it is appropriate to call to mind
here the famous statement of E. A. Burtt, in his monumental work,  The Metaphysical
Foundations of Modern Physical Science, who wrote in the early part of the last century,
“the only way to avoid becoming a metaphysician is to say nothing.”14    
     Suffice it to say, then, that for our present purposes, any emergent philosophy for
global times must also entail a new metaphysics that takes a clear stand on the question of
universals.  And whereas I do not see how any lasting and viable metaphysics can ever
unqualifiedly reject realism, I want to suggest that a new brand of philosophic realism
emerges when we take seriously the possibility of cultures as philosophic sources.  This
new brand of philosophic realism implies the real existence of universals, but insists that
no truly existing reality is entirely unitary, and that all realities and indeed all reality is
constituted  precisely  through  relation.  Upon  this  approach,  neither  universal  nor
particular terms have any metaphysical or ontological meaning whatsoever except when
defined in the context of an ‘immanent intrinsic complementarity of at least two personal
beings constituting  the Absolute’. This particular expression comes from the work of a
contemporary Spanish metaphysician, Fernando Rielo, who while accounting for the real
existence  of  both  the  universals  of  description  and  the  universals  of  definition,  also
significantly shifts the vantage point of the traditional question concerning “whether” or
“where” the universal exists.15  While considering the goodness and beauty of a light
purple flower, for instance, the question now is not so much about “whether” or “where”
the  descriptive  universal  “purple”  exists,  or  “whether”  or  “where”  the  universals  of
substance, “flowerness” or “colorness” or “beauty” or “goodness” exist, it is much more
about “how” such realities exist in the sense of being what they are and more than what
they are simultaneously, since his very notion of being is not simply that being is being,
as in Parmenides, but that being is more than being, a notion of being that he tries to
capture with the expression “being +”.   To say that no truly existing reality is entirely
unitary, and that all realities and indeed all reality itself, all being, is constituted precisely
through  relation,  is  commensurate  with the results  of a series  of conferences held in
Indonesia that discussed the emergence of philosophy from the specific contributions of
the cultures  of Java.  As the Council  for Research in Values and Philosophy stated it
recently  on  their  website,  “Javanese  culture  has  a  distinctive  notion  called  Memayu
Hayuning  Bawono.  This  notion  has  the  phenomenological  dimension  that  human
consciousness  is  not  a  solipsistic  entity  but  a  disclosure.  According  to  this  cultural
conception, human consciousness is not trapped within a microcosm (bawono cilik), but
reaches  toward  the  macrocosm  (bawono  gede).  This  brings  new  meaning  to  self
consciousness and its ethical implication, for self-consciousness is not a substance, but a
relationship. This suggests a radical shift in our ethical paradigm.  It is not only by a
categorical  imperative  that  we  develop  ourselves  through  fulfilling  certain  universal
maxims, but we are continuously developing an ethic of cosmic solidarity.”16
     This rich philosophical insight emerging from Indonesian culture is commensurate
with the results yielded by the work of Rielo as he redefines and purifies the language
surrounding the problem of universals  by applying his understanding of metaphysical
language as the  living transcendental definition.  The first term he purifies is the term
universal itself.  He rejects the notion of “universal,” when that notion is qualified by the
term “abstract.”  For Rielo, abstraction, in spite of the claims made by Hegel, Husserl,
Frege, and Russell, to have introduced new and better usages of both the term and the
process, always consists, for Rielo, whether in Ancient, Medieval, or Modern philosophy,
of  “extracting  from a plurality  something which  is  common to it  in  order  to  form a
supposedly universal entity by separating it from the singular instances.”  Such a method
is what Rielo calls a “squinting variety of metaphysical vision,” and can only lead to the
production  of  a  concept  lacking syntactic,  semantic,  and metaphysical  meaning.17  A
further mistake occurs, according to Rielo,  when this  empty concept is “raised to the
absolute” to serve as a universal, necessary, axiomatic and absolute principle. Such an ill-
formed procedure, rather than “augmenting a notion [in order to] discover its consistency,
completeness,  and  decidability,”  acts  to  reduce  the  supposedly  abstract  property,
whatever it may happen to be, say “flowerness” or “color” or “purpleness” or “beauty” or
“goodness,” in  such a way as when separated from its  singular  instances,  becomes a
tautology so that  “flowerness is  flowerness,” and “color is  color,” and “purpleness is
purpleness,” and “beauty is beauty” and “goodness is goodness.”  Needless to say, such
statements are meaningless and can never help to realize the new humanism or ‘ethics of
cosmic solidarity’ we desire.  For Rielo, the “raising to the absolute” must confirm the
singular (not the universal) character of relation. For this purpose, he introduces the term
absolutivization rather than absolutization.  Thus he absolutivizes all universal concepts
in such a way that when we say, for instance, that the rose is beautiful, we are not saying
that an abstract reality called “beauty” exists and that that particular rose participates in
the  abstract  “beauty,”  but  rather  that  a  “singular”  absolute  beauty  exists,  which  is
constituted  by  a  binity,  that  is  to  say,  by  at  least  two  transcendent  entities  in
complementary relation; this means that the singular “beauty” of that particular rose is
“in” the rose in  virtue of  the two transcendent  entities  that  constitute  and sustain its
existence.  In this way, the mystical beauty of the rose is a  vestige of the transcendent-
relational  (or  divine)  beauty.   Now  when  universal  concepts  such  as  “beauty”  or
“goodness” are predicated of a particular human being, we are not to claim, just as we did
not  claim  in  the  example  of  the  rose,  that  an  abstract  reality  called  “beauty”  or
“goodness” exists.  For instance, if we say that Joseph is “good,” this does not mean that
there exists an abstract reality called “goodness,” in which Joseph participates.  What
exists rather, according to Rielo, is the singular Absolute Goodness, constituted by at
least two transcendent entities in relation.  The singular goodness of Joseph is in Joseph,
then, in virtue of the transcendent constitutive presence of the Absolute Goodness of the
transcendent  entities  (or  divine  persons)  in  Joseph,  who,  in  their  relation  with  one
another, constitute Joseph as mystical goodness of the ‘divine’ goodness.  Now if we take
the universal concept  man or  humanity  and absolutivize it in the same way, something
quite profound emerges. First,  it  necessitates the rejection of an abstract reality called
“humanity”,  in  which  each particular  human participates,  and claims,  rather,  that  the
singular “humanity,” of say, Joseph, is “in” Joseph in virtue of the divine constitutive
presence of the Absolute “humanity,”  of the ‘divine’ persons in Joseph, who, in their
relation with one another, constitute Joseph as mystical humanity of the divine humanity. 
     A serious objection from certain philosophical circles is easily anticipated here, since
talk of divine or transcendent persons entails religion and revelation, which is not, some
may argue,  properly philosophical.   However,  if  we take  seriously  the  possibility  of
philosophy  emerging  from cultures,  and  also  see  that  at  the  heart  of  every  genuine
culture,  there  is  a  profound  religious  tradition  that  has  provided  insights  into  the
transcendent and mystical dimensions of human interiority and consciousness, then we
should, I believe, accept these insights as properly philosophical.  In other words, and to
put it more simply, we must accept, at the least, that in their various traditions of religious
revelation, religious cultures possess many ideas about the nature of man, the universe,
and life that are reasonable, and it would be unreasonable (un-philosophical) to simply
dismiss them out of hand.  
     Returning then, to the way a new metaphysical approach to the problem of universals
can provide us with a definition of man that is dynamic, mystical, and even ‘divine’, and
one that complements an account of self consciousness as a relationship, rather than a
substance, we are struck by the ethical implications of such a view in bringing about the
new humanism. For those who would reject such a vision as idealistic and unattainable, I
would suggest the way forward, somewhat surprisingly perhaps, by first pointing back to
a period in history that in some ways provides a model for philosophers today, who see
the value in eliciting philosophical insights from living religious cultures.      
     Beginning in the sixth century, and continuing well into the seventh, an explosion of
philosophical  insight occurred as a result  of an extremely dynamic  synthesis  that can
rightly  be  described  as  emerging  from  culture.  Syriac  speaking  Christians,  heirs  to
Mesopotamian and Jewish culture, living primarily in the regions of what are today Syria
and southeast Turkey, began to translate, develop, and transmit ancient Greek thought
and culture into Syriac.  In the ninth and tenth centuries, the great Arab translators, under
the  patronage  of  the  ‘Abassid  Islamic  dynasty,  and in  conjunction  with these  Syriac
speaking Christians, who also knew Arabic and had begun to assimilate Arabic culture as
well, began to translate this great and living heritage from Syriac into Arabic, thereby not
only transmitting the ancient Greek wisdom, but substantially developing it. This latter
stage,  because of  the  geographical,  political  and economic  realities  at  that  time,  also
received the insights and wisdom of Persian,  Indian, and (later  during the Mongolian
period)  Chinese  thought,  culture  and  religion,  making  this  period  one  of  the  most
dynamic cultural and philosophical interchanges in history.  The philosophical result was
dynamic and long lasting, providing both the solid foundation and building materials for
the  further  construction  of  what  would  come  to  be  known  as  modern  science  and
civilization,  once texts  were brought  to Spain via  northern Africa and translated  into
Latin in the tenth and eleventh centuries.    Even a cursory examination of what may
rightly  be  called  Arabic  philosophy,  (in  which  Jews,  Christians,  and  Muslims  all
participated  in  developing)  reveals  that  the  fundamental  impetus  at  the  heart  of  this
philosophical and cultural exchange was a religious one, overwhelmingly concerned with
reconciling  scientific  insights  with the  similar  versions  of revelation  contained in  the
Holy texts. These scientific insights were not merely the scientific achievements of Greek
science transmitted to the West via Syriac and Arabic, in the precise form they were
received, but, as stated above, were substantially developed by Oriental Christians, and
then by Arab and Persian Muslims and Jews, aided to some extent,  by insights from
Indian and then later (in the Mongolian period) Chinese religious cultures.  The crucial
point here is that in the process of transmitting Greek science, those Jews, Christians, and
Muslims concerned with reconciling science and revelation, actually moved the scientific
and philosophical project forward; their concern to reconcile their religious truths with
scientific truths did not hold science or philosophy back, but propelled it forward.  With
respect to science, the new achievements included “a far more advanced number theory
and algebra,  a new system of trigonometry,  a medical  corpus much greater  than that
available in the Greek world, and an entirely original theory of optics more powerful than
anything known to the Greeks and that was not only to form the mathematical basis for
the  Renaissance  art  but  also to  inspire  new directions  in  scientific  practice.”18  With
respect to the philosophical achievements, there were notable advances in ontology and
epistemology; questions about whether the world was eternal or created in time pushed
the ontological project forward, whereas questions concerning the existence of necessary
causes in nature stimulated epistemological discussion.  And needless to say, at the heart
of  both  the  ontological  and  epistemological  discussion,  was  the  age-old  question  of
universals. The deliberations in this regard naturally took up the question concerning the
universal ‘humanity’, and quite often in the context a theological anthropology that laid
particular stress upon the ‘mystical’ and ‘divine’ nature of the individual man in relation
first to God and then to other personal beings, including angels and other human beings.
It is not the time to explore the details of this medieval discussion, but again, the central
point here is that progress, both scientific and philosophical, emerged as a result of open
and dynamic interchange among religious cultures.  
     To return now, by way of conclusion, to the question of the cause/effect relation
between philosophy and culture in the light of our reflections above, I suggest that since
the unity of each individual person, like the unity of every individual thing, is constituted
by being in relation to another ‘thing’ transcendent to it, then ultimately there is only one
culture,  the culture of man.   But this  one culture emerges  naturally as many cultures
springing from the rich diversity that each individual man is by nature.  The unity and
development of distinct cultures, as well as the deeper unity and development of the one
‘culture of man’ is not natural, however, in the sense of being automatic, they must be
chosen and appropriated anew by each new generation if they are to endure.  This process
of development is precisely the role of philosophy in that the philosopher, reflecting upon
both the diversity and unity of culture and cultures,  which is found as a given in the
world, identifies those common values and ideas that ground individual cultures and that
complement, in their diversity, the one culture of humanity.  In this way a new humanism
emerges wherein the individual person and peoples are simultaneously human and more
than human—perhaps we should say divine: simultaneously one and many, changing and
immutable.  This is what Maritain, and many others like him in the last century, devoted
their  lives to the cultivation of, and why they approached the study of culture in the
context  of  a  new  humanism  that  could  “render  man  more  truly  human  and  [could]
manifest his original greatness by enabling him to partake of everything in nature and in
history capable of enriching him.”19
     The philosopher, reflecting upon the unity and diversity of cultures, who can draw
upon the treasures contained in the religious roots therein, is able to cultivate a balanced
epistemology, wherein the objective, necessary, and universal dimensions of knowledge
are properly complemented by the dimensions of subjectivity,  the contingent,  and the
individual.  Such an epistemology guards against the two extremes of moral and cultural
relativism on the one hand, and against the scientistic terrorism and fanaticism of moral,
cultural, and religious absolutism on the other.  
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